The article analyses China's 16+1 and Belt and 
The Summit of China and Central and Eastern European countries in Riga in November 2016 became a formative and symbolic experience for Latvia, in the context of its relationship with China. Hosting the summit was perceived and framed in Latvia as extending and deepening the country's engagement and mutual trust-building with China. The gathering of representatives from China and Central and Eastern European countries was also considered as an opportunity to take economic and diplomatic advantage of the 16+1 partnerships and China's ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (Kučinskis 2016) . At the same time, the summit in Riga provided an appropriate moment to reflect and assess the developments and prospects of both 16+1 and the Belt and Road Initiative.
The article will analyse China's two initiatives towards Central and Eastern
Europe and beyond, from Latvia's perspective. In order to achieve this goal The paper is structured corresponding to the above questions. The first part of the paper focuses on the challenging task of charting the diversity of visions, agendas and interests involved in the two initiatives. It outlines both the opportunities and constraints to the synergy between a variety of stakeholders and interests. The second section elaborates on the important principle of connectivity. Although connectivity may embrace a number of aspects, the main attention here is on the developing economic and infrastructural linkages, as they can readily demonstrate concrete practical steps and achievements. The last part of the paper analyses the strategic dimension of transcontinental initiatives. In times of uncertainty, Central and Eastern European countries, including Latvia, must increasingly take into account both the economic benefits and strategic implications of the 16+1 and Belt and Road Initiatives.
The paper is based on a growing number of scientific and analytical resources. Scientific literature on China's international ambitions and activities is abundant (Lanteigne 2016; Carver 2016 ; Tan Li, Larry D. Qui and Ying Xue 2016). With the advent of the New Silk Road idea, scientific research focused specifically on China's "going out" strategy is rapidly increasing (Godement and Kratz 2015; Hongying Wang 2016; Wang Yiwei 2016; Ghiasy and Jiayi Zhou 2017) . However, the analysis of the role, place, and perspectives of the Central and Eastern European countries vis-à-vis China's ambitious initiatives is more fragmentary. The distribution and scope of research findings on Central and East European countries relations with China remains rather limited and unevenly spread among the countries and institutions in the region. At the same time, "islands" of regional expertise on relations with China in Central and Eastern Europe are forming. These islands look beyond bilateral interaction and place the 16+1 format into a wider context. Among the CEE countries, Poland has demonstrated increasing capacity and resources in assessment of China's strategy and activities, including in the Central and Eastern European region (Jakoby 2016; Kaczmarski 2016; Jakobowski 2015; Szczudlik 2016) .
Moreover, opportunities and constraints for synergies with China's various initiatives have also been discussed by Chinese counterparts (Liu Zuokui 2016a; 2016b) . The research in the Baltic countries essentially reflects thoroughly on China's motivations and the implications for the Baltic states and the wider region (Andrijauskas 2015) . Analysis in, and on, Latvia in the context of China's initiatives fits into this regional picture and necessitates further research. Most research activity in Latvia on China's global and regional initiatives has been carried out under the auspices of the Latvian Institute of International Affairs (Andžāns and Sprūds 2016) .
Managing diversity: visions, agendas and interests
A strategic vision is indispensable for a transcontinental, inter-civilizational, and infrastructural endeavour on the scale envisaged by China's Belt and Road Initiative. China's opening towards the West is based on the win-win philosophy of mutual understanding, respect and benefit (Li Keqiang 2016) .
The initiative aims to contribute to the creation of an embracing, inclusive, and pluralistic community. The Belt and Road Initiative has facilitated a mental re-mapping of geographic space and has already gained the image of a grand engagement, inter-civilizational connectivity and mutual enrichment. Latvia has not been an exception here, experiencing an emergence of China on the country's mental maps and political and business agenda in recent years (Martyn-Hemphill and Morisseau 2015 The importance of and adherence to the Trans-Atlantic dimension initially found its presence in the concept of the New Silk Road promoted by the United States (Starr 2007: 5-32) . However, the limitations of the US New Silk Road initiative emerged soon (Standish 2014) . The uncertainty of the US initiative and the emerging prospective of economic opportunities in the context of China's own Silk Road thinking, motivated Latvia, alongside Estonia and Lithuania, to join the format of 16+1 established in 2012. Taking into account China's implicit objective to limit US presence in developing major mainland routes in Eurasia (Fallon 2015: 140-147) , the evolution and pragmatic turn of Latvia's and its partners' positions become noticeable.
European necessities have provided another dimension to the somewhat challenging task of reconciling a variety of visions and agendas and promoting synergy in the context of the 16+1 format. 11 Central and East European countries of the format have become members of the European Union. This has added to the importance of the region in the eyes of the Chinese, whose regional presence may become a window of opportunity for them to shape relations with the EU. On the other hand, Central and East Europe has been perceived as an "outskirt" of the European Union, which is obliged to follow the Community's requirements and instructions (Kaczmarski and Jakobowski 2015) . Hence, the region has arguably become a certain backdoor into the EU and Europe at large for China's political and business interests. 
Economic and Infrastructural Connectivity
Connectivity has become the defining feature of China's modern Silk Russia's sovereign multipolar thinking makes it a complicated partner in transcontinental win-win endeavours. Russia's assertiveness in the postSoviet space, which it apparently is willing to approach as its backyard, preclude from building a wider community of mutual trust and respect.
Quite the opposite, Russia's aggressiveness in Ukraine invoked ghosts of insecurity and neo-imperialism and was a regional security wake-up call for many neighbouring countries. Moreover, Russia promotes and develops its own integration project of the Eurasian Economic Union, including in Central Asia, and has approached jealously any potentially competitive visions (Makocki and Popescu 2016: 47-49) . The time of overlapping integrative spaces in Russian strategic thinking has evidently passed.
On the other hand, the picture is more complex when accounting for will not become a substitute for strategic vision and will not create a community of the like-minded in Eurasia. The EU may need to put more emphasis on promoting a rules based global order for global and regional governance. Although clearly the "rules based order" could be interpreted through the prism of national interests, a number of agendas converge. The EU and China are both interested in dealing with current traditional and non-traditional global and regional security challenges such as terrorism, cyber security, energy and environment, human development and resilience. This creates a platform for more coherent engagement (Ghiasy and Zhou 2017: 45-56) .
The 16+1 format comes into the strategic picture of EU-China relations as both a nuisance for Brussels and dynamic test ground for a further engagement. The 16+1 initiative has been perceived by some in the EU as China's deliberate creation of its regional "Trojan horse" in the EU policy-making corridors (Stanzel et al. 2016) . On the other hand, in the absence of common voice, the 16+1 platform has become a test ground for also developing the EU's strategic thinking and practical cooperation in connectivity, trade and investments (Long Jing 2016:
Conclusions
China's transcontinental connectivity initiatives have obtained momentum. This is a success in times of uncertainty. The Belt and Road Initiative remains a non-institutionalized cooperation work-in-progress and will be shaped by a variety of stakeholders. The 16+1 format has developed into a dynamic institutionalized platform with a spectrum of challenges and opportunities.
Positive spill-over from this vision of engagement, intensifying economic cooperation and regional stability will depend on mutual interest and the ability to harmonize competing interests and find synergy. A number of synergies must be achieved in the Eurasian space to achieve political, human, economic and infrastructural connectivity. The European Union,
Eurasian Economic Union, Eastern Partnership and Shanghai Cooperation
Organization are only a few institutional frameworks and initiatives that must be taken into account. opportunities. Yet, playing proactively at several diplomatic and business chessboards has become a matter of necessity rather than choice.
